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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this thesis was to conduct an analysis of cases of requests for Top
Secret security clearances from applicants whose backgrounds showed some derogatory
financial information, to determine the impact of the delinquent debt threshold used to
expand personnel security investigations on final clearance decisions. To conduct the
analysis, a sample of completed cases meeting the Defense Investigative Service's (DIS)
delinquent debt criteria for investigation expansion ($500 or more outstanding for 1 20 days)
was selected. The total amount of delinquent debt for each case was recorded and
classified in one of three debt categories, under $1000, $1000 to $2000, and over $2000. In
order to determine final clearance decisions, the sample data were merged with the
Defense Central Investigations (DCII) data base. This provided a breakdown by clearance
denials and approvals at the various delinquent debt categories. The analysis suggests that
delinquent debt levels play less of a role in determining final clearance outcomes than was
originally anticipated; it also provide some empirical support for raising the delinquent
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I . INTRODUCTION
A. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The Defense Investigative Service's (DIS) principal
mission is to conduct personnel security investigations and
to determine security clearance eligibility for all
Department of Defense (DoD) military and civilian personnel
and for employees of industrial firms working on classified
government programs. The clearance is a determination that
is consistent with the national interest to grant or
continue a security clearance for an applicant. It is in
effect, a prediction of an individual's future behavior and
whether the person can be relied on to protect the country's
most sensitive information. Personnel who are granted
clearances are important because, in the final analysis, the
nation' s survival may depend upon the ability of cleared
personnel to protect the nation' s secrets and to help the
U.S. maintain its technological superiority over potential
enemies
.
The purpose of security investigations is to select the
most trustworthy personnel for sensitive or critical
positions. Occasionally, during the course of an
investigation, unfavorable or adverse information is
reported that may place the applicant's security clearance
in jeopardy. One category of unfavorable information that
has received considerable attention from the DIS in recent
years is derogatory financial background information. In a
continuing effort to evaluate the effectiveness of its
policies and procedures, DIS has been concerned about the
reasonableness of its current delinquent debt criteria for
investigation expansions. An investigation now is expanded
when the credit bureau report discloses an account (s) with a
cumulative unpaid balance of $500 or more and 120 days or
more past due. This may include cases of (1) repossessions,
(2) making payments under a wage earner plan or similar
arrangement, (3) debts that are charged off, (4) debts
charged off with no balance on the credit report, (4) debts
placed for collection, or (5) outstanding delinquent debt
not placed for collection or charged off. Expansion means
that the scope of the investigation must be broadened, as
necessary, to resolve the unfavorable information that was
known at the time the investigation was initiated or was
developed during the course of the investigation.
When potentially derogatory financial information is
reported or discovered in an applicant's background and it
meets DIS' threshold criteria, an expanded investigation on
the issue (s) in question is initiated and the case is
designated as an "issue case" [Ref. ll:p. 1]. Issue cases
are important because they signify that there is adverse
information in the person's background which might reflect
negatively on that person' s trustworthiness and reliability
and, thus, on qualifications to hold a high level security
clearance. The operational significance of the issue case
designation is that expanded investigations require
substantially more personnel and budgetary resources. [Ref.
ll:p. 1]
There has been no analysis conducted to determine the
impact that the current DIS delinquent debt threshold has on
final clearance determinations. If this threshold is too
low, DIS must expend significant time and money to uncover
additional information that may not have any impact on final
clearance decisions. If an analysis determines that this
threshold amount can be raised, it would mean that DIS could
reduce the number of expanded investigations and free up
scarce resources for use in other security programs
.
The Defense Investigative Service's current delinquent
debt threshold was established in May 1983 [Ref. 2]. Since
then, eight years have passed and there have been a number
of changes in the U.S. economy. One of these changes is the
increase in consumer prices. Figure 1 compares the cost of
a $500 market basket bought by a typical consumer in May
1983 when the current delinquent debt threshold was
established with the amount it would cost today. That
figure was computed by using the monthly consumer index
publications from May 1983 until March 1991. The graph
shows that the same market basket bought in 1983 for $500
$500 MARKET BASKET
(Purchasing Same Basket of Goods
In 1991 Compared To 1983 Using CPI)
1000
Dollars
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Calender Year
1989 1990 1991
Source: Monthly CPIs May 1983-Mar 1991
Figure 1. $500 Market Basket
would now cost almost twice as much.
Another major economic change is that budget deficits
have been at an all time high. With almost yearly
legislation calling for a balanced budget and a decreased
perception of there being a serious external military threat
to national security, all DoD components should anticipate
having to complete their missions with fewer resources.
As the Director, Defense Investigative Service stated in
a November 198 8 memorandum to the Assistant Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Counterintelligence and Security,
the personnel security program is not static, it is
dynamic and requires reevaluation to ensure that
policies and procedures continue to be effective and an
appropriate use of resources [Ref . 1]
.
In the Defense Investigative Service's report on
achievements in 198 9, it was reported that the number of
cases in which derogatory information was developed before
the investigation was closed has been increasing over the
past few years. Furthermore, the percentage of issue cases
to total cases closed had increased from 8.7 percent in
fiscal year 1980 to 20.8 percent in fiscal year 1989
[Ref.3:p. 11].
Overall investigation closings have been unable to keep
pace with overall openings since 1985, mainly because of
budget cuts [Ref. 3:p.l0]. With more budget cuts on the
horizon, the Defense Investigative Service must find ways to
meet possible future resource reductions while, at the same
time, maintain a viable investigative organization. There
may be possible savings in the area of investigation
expansions if the criteria used for expansions are carefully
analyzed and evaluated.
B. OBJECTIVES OF THIS ANALYSIS
The purpose of this thesis is to conduct an analysis of
cases with derogatory financial background information to
determine the impact of the level of delinquent debt used to
expand investigations on final clearance decisions. If a
higher delinquent debt threshold is considered acceptable in
place of the one currently in use and is implemented, DIS
would be able to shift vital resources from investigation
expansions to more critical program areas.
C. DEFINITION OF TERMS
To assist the reader in fully understanding Defense
Investigative Service terminology, this section provides an




Adjudication - The process whereby an adjudicator
analyzes derogatory data acquired in a personnel
security investigation and attempts to reconcile those
data with standards for granting a security clearance.
2. Adjudicator - A person who evaluates the information
set forth within a completed personnel security
investigation and makes a determination of whether or
not it is clearly consistent with the interest of
national security to grant the subject of the
investigation or continue a security clearance [Ref.
4:p. 1-3].
3. Background Investigation (BI) - An inquiry into the
activities of an individual that is designed to develop
information on which to base decisions regarding access
and sensitive program participation. A BI is the
minimum investigative requirement for granting a Top
Secret clearance or for participation in certain
sensitive programs. The period of investigation covers
the last five years of the subject's life or from the
date of the 18th birthday, which ever is the shorter
period, provided it covers the last two full years of
the subject's life but does not precede the 16th
birthday. It consists of verification of birth,
citizenship, education and employment; a review of all
federal agencies for derogatory information (National
Agency Check) ; a credit check; a check of appropriate
criminal records; character references; and an
interview with the subject. [Ref. 4:p. 2-8]
4. Expansion - Conducted when significant adverse
information meeting the DIS's threshold criteria is
reported or developed during the course of a personnel
security investigation. The adverse information must
be resolved before the applicant can be granted a
clearance. A DIS agent must interview the applicant
and take a statement concerning the adverse
information. The agent acquires written or oral
statements from the other parties involved (e.g.
creditors) and documents the findings, which become
part of the investigation.
5. Highly Sensitive Position - A position in which the
incumbent could take actions, such as theft of
classified information, that would lead to a materially
adverse effect on the national security, as in the case
of espionage.
6. National Agency Check (NAC) - A search of the indexes
and files of appropriate federal agencies for
information bearing on the loyalty, trustworthiness,
and suitability of individuals under the investigative
jurisdiction of the Department of Defense (DoD) [Ref.
4:p. 1-4]
.
7. Periodic Reinvestigation (PR) - Conducted every five
years for personnel with completed background
investigations and every 6 years for personnel with
completed National Agency Checks and Secret access.
Involves completion of a NAC, verification of
employment, local agency checks, credit check, an
interview with the subject, and field interviews with
coworkers and references.
8. Personnel Security Investigation (PSI) - An
investigation required for the purpose of determining
an individual's eligibility for access to classified
information, retention in sensitive positions, or other
designated duties requiring such an investigation.
PSIs, which include investigations of subversive
affiliations and suitability, are conducted for the
purpose of making personnel security determinations.
They also include investigations of allegations which
arise subsequent to adjudicative actions. [Ref. 4:p. 1-
5]
9. Scoping - The process of reviewing an investigative
request, as well as ongoing investigative efforts for
the purpose of determining the areas and the depth into
which an investigative inquiry is to be made [Ref. 4:p,
1-5] .
10. Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) -
Intelligence or intelligence related materials that
require special handling. The Director of Central
Intelligence is responsible for protecting this
information
.
11. Special Background Information (SBI) - Minimum
requirement for access to Sensitive
Compartmented Information and to participate in
certain other sensitive programs. The period of
investigation covers the last 15 years of the
applicant's life or from the date of the 18th
birthday, provided it covers at least the last two
years. Includes all requirements of a Background
Investigation. The National Agency Check coverage is
increased, and neighborhood checks are made, with
interviews of knowledgeable neighbors when
available. [Ref. 4:p. 2-11]
D. SUMMARY
The purpose of this thesis is to conduct an analysis to
determine the impact on final security clearance
determinations of raising the delinquent debt threshold
currently used by the DIS to determine whether to expand
personnel security investigations. To conduct the analysis,
a sample of completed cases with derogatory financial
background information that met DIS's delinquent debt
criteria was selected. The total amount of delinquent debt
for each case was computed and coded for computer input.
The sample file was then merged with the Defense Central
Investigations Index (DCII) file to determine the final
clearance decision for each case. This provided a sample
breakdown of clearance approvals and denials at the various
delinquent debt levels. In the sample, denials at every
delinquent debt level was very low. The analysis suggests
that delinquent debt levels play less of a role in
determining final clearance outcomes than was originally
anticipated; it also provides some empirical support for
raising the delinquent debt threshold above the current $500
amount
.
II. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW
A. DIS ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES
The Defense Investigation Service (DIS) is a centrally
directed security investigative service for the Department
of Defense (DoD) . It is a separate agency of DoD under the
direction of the Deputy Under Secretary for Security Policy.
DIS was established to consolidate DoD's personnel security
process and to eliminate the need for different DoD
components (e.g. Navy, Air Force, and Army) to employ their
own investigative staffs. DIS has personnel security
investigative authority over DoD civilian personnel, the
military services, contractor personnel and other personnel
who are affiliated with DoD. DIS's organization includes
regional investigative offices, field activities, the
Personnel Investigations Center (PIC) located in Baltimore,
Maryland, and the Defense Industrial Security Clearance
Office (DISCO) located in Columbus, Ohio. Special agents at
regional offices and field activities are responsible for
conducting personnel security investigations. When an
application for a security clearance is submitted, PIC
initiates the investigation process by assigning it to a
field activity. PIC, as one of the quality assurance arms
of DIS, is responsible for the proper management of a
10
clearance request from beginning to end. DISCO is
responsible for processing industrial personnel security
clearance applications submitted to PIC. DISCO reviews all
industrial security clearance investigation findings and
either grants a clearance or refers the case to the
Directorate for Industrial Security Clearance Review
(DISCR) . DISCR is part of the DoD Office of the General
Counsel and is responsible for making final determination of
eligibility for a security clearance in cases which have
significant adverse information. DoD civilian and military
personnel cases with significant adverse information are
forwarded to the DoD components that requested the clearance
and those components perform the adjudication.
B. PERSONNEL SECURITY INVESTIGATION PROCESS
DoD Regulation 5200. 2-R establishes DoD personnel
security policies and procedures, identifies standards and
guidelines for personnel security determinations and
prescribes the types of investigations needed to satisfy
security clearance requirements for sensitive positions
[Ref . 5] . The objective of a personnel security
investigation is to determine an individual's eligibility
for access to classified information and assignment to a
sensitive or critical position.
An agency requests the security clearance needed for an
applicant on the basis of the level of classified
11
information the applicant needs to do his job. National
security information is classified at one of three levels:
Top Secret, Secret, or Confidential. The level of
classification depends on the extent of damage to national
security which could result from the unauthorized disclosure
of the information. Unauthorized disclosure of Top Secret
information could cause exceptionally grave damage; Secret,
serious damage; and Confidential, damage.
In general, the higher the sensitivity of the position,
the higher the clearance level, and thus the more extensive
the investigation process. An investigation to grant a top
secret clearance costs a lot more and is more manpower-
intensive than an investigation for a secret clearance.
Although the stated purpose of the program is to identify
and select individuals with favorable background
information, personnel security procedures are not
structured to identify behavioral information useful in
selecting people for sensitive positions [Ref. 8: p. 4]. 1
Instead, negative or derogatory information is sought in
order to deny untrustworthy people clearances. Under these
circumstances, rejection for a security clearance as a
result of a background investigation has serious negative
xAgencies such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
and Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) data files are
checked by DIS during the investigative process to detect
evident of past derogatory behavior of a criminal nature.
In credit bureaus reports, the DIS is primarily
interested in signs of financial irresponsibility.
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result of a background investigation has serious negative
implications. Disqualified individuals are labeled as
security risks. Relatively few military (less than 3
percent) are denied clearances based on background
investigations, and less than 1 percent of contractors'
personnel are denied clearances [Ref. 8:p. 4].
When derogatory information is reported during an
investigation and requires resolution, a determination must
be made by case controllers at the Personnel Investigations
Center concerning whether the investigation needs to be
expanded. The scope must by expanded to resolve potentially
significant adverse information that was either self-
reported or uncovered during the investigation. If there is
no requirement to conduct a complete investigation, as in
the case of a complaint (an allegation of unsuitable
behavior made concerning a person who, at the time of the
allegation, already holds a security clearance) , the
investigation will cover only those issues necessary to
resolved the adverse information.
C. SUITABILITY INFORMATION
Most clearance denials by DoD authorities are based on
derogatory suitability information. The Department of
Defense Manual for Personnel Security Investigations, which
also establishes basic adjudication policy, provides the
following examples of derogatory suitability information:
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(1) criminal conduct, (2) drug usage, (3) unethical
conduct, (4) falsification-misrepresentation, (5) financial
irresponsibility, (6) foreign travel-foreign connections,
(7) use of intoxicants, (8) questionable loyalty, (9) mental
illness, (10) dubious moral character, (11) refusal by
subject to answer background questions, and (12) sexual
misconduct [Ref. 2:p 2-28].
This study focuses on the unsuitability issue of
financial irresponsibility and, specifically, the delinquent
debt threshold standard used by the Defense Investigative
Service to expand investigations. Is the delinquent debt
threshold of $500 outstanding for 120 days significant
enough to require an expanded investigation, and what impact
does the level of delinquent debt have on the final
clearance determination? This report attempts to resolve
these questions.
If an investigation discloses that a history of
financial irresponsibility exists, that financial problems
continued after a bankruptcy, uncertainty whether delinquent
accounts with zero balances were paid or charged off, or
adverse information that delinquent debt exceeds the
threshold, then the case is expanded. The applicant is
interviewed by a DIS agent, is given the opportunity to
explain the circumstances surrounding the unfavorable
information and to make a statement. The scope of the
investigation is broadened as necessary to resolve the
14
Adverse financial information and the indebtedness of
individuals are major concerns of DIS because it is believed
that people who have major financial difficulties may be
more prone to accepting money in exchange for classified
information. It is also believed that they may behave in a
less responsible manner, which might also constitute a
security threat. Effective individual prediction of who
will and will not become a spy before the fact is extremely
difficult, if not impossible, to accomplish. The Defense
Investigative Service investigative process attempts to
identify individuals who are higher security risks than
others. A person with significant delinquent debt is
considered to be in that higher security risk category.
D. LITERATURE REVIEW
The rash of espionage in the U.S. during the 1980s
brought the personnel security investigation process under
considerable scrutiny. Many, including Congress, questioned
the Defense Investigative Service' s ability to perform its
primary mission of identifying those individuals that the
nation would trust with its most sensitive information.
Hearings were held and studies were conducted to evaluate
and to provide recommendations to improve the investigative
process. The significant findings and recommendations from
these various studies are discussed in this section.
15
1 . Number of Security Clearances
In a July 1988 article for Security Management ,
Thomas J. O'Brien, the Director of DIS at that time, wrote
that
personnel security clearances and the individuals who
hold them have always represented the weakest link in
any security system. Reduction in the number of cleared
personnel represents a commensurate reduction in risk.
[Ref. 14:p. 62]
In April 1985, hearings were held before the Senate
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations concerning the
effectiveness of the government's security clearance
programs. The consensus among virtually all the witnesses
was that, in the national security field, too many
clearances were being requested, too many were being granted
and, unless the numbers were reduced substantially, the
ultimate result would be a personnel security system of
significantly diminished value [Ref. l:p. 2], During these
hearings, the Defense Investigative Service (DIS) estimated
that the number of Department of Defense (DoD) clearances
for military, civilian, contractor personnel and reservists
was over 4,306,000 (a 40 percent increase from 1980 to 1985)
and acknowledged that the sheer magnitude of the numbers of
cleared employees presented a nearly insurmountable manpower
problem for the Defense Investigative Service [Ref. 12: pp.
2-3]
. A study by the DoD Industrial Security Review
Committee in 1984 [Ref. 13 :p. 74] and a study by the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence [Ref. 7:P. 2]
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agreed with the findings of the Senate Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations.
To deal with this proliferation of personnel
security clearances, in 1985 the Secretary of Defense
implemented a clearance reduction program within the
government and industry. By 1988, the DoD had reduced the
total number of clearances from 4.2 million in 1985 to 2.8
million. Contractor clearances included in this total were
reduced from a level of 1.4 million to 1.1 million [Ref. 10:
p. 13] . 2
2 . Delays In Processing Personnel Security Clearances
A major fallout of the proliferation of security
clearances was inordinate delays in processing security
requests. The DoD Industrial Security Review Committee in
its report to the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for
Policy wrote:
personnel security clearance processing time is
excessive and wasteful. Industry cannot afford to have
its employees remain idle for months, or to place
employees in temporary positions, while they await the
granting of a personnel security clearance. Even if the
processing goals established by the DIS are achieved,
the time between the application for clearance and the
clearance grant will remain excessive. [Ref. 12 :p. 100]
The 1985 Stilwell Commission report [Ref. 6:p. 9]
Reference 10 on this page cites the total number of
clearances in 1985 as 4.2 million whereas reference 12 on
page 14 cites the total number of clearances in 1985 as 4 . 3




and a 1981 General Accounting Office (GAO) report agreed
with the DoD Industrial Security Review Committee finding.
The GAO report noticed that security clearance requests for
DoD and industry personnel increased from 766,700 in 1978 to
903,500 in 1981, or about 18 percent, but that DIS personnel
who investigated and processed the requests had remain
constant [Ref. 15:p. ii] . GAO found that an increase in the
number of clearance requests and insufficient DIS staff to
process this increase in requests as the main reasons for
excessive delays in processing clearances. Although DoD
standards for processing requests for a background
investigation and national agency check were 90 and 30 days,
respectively, as of May 1981 GAO found that industry
requests for clearances were taking an average of 220 and
103 days, respectively [Ref. 15:p. ii]
.
To alleviate this excessive processing time for
clearances, the Stilwell Commission and the DoD Industrial
Security Review Committee recommended that DIS review all
clearance requests for possible issuance of interim
clearances
. Because issuance of clearances under interim
procedures had not proven unduly risky, the DoD Industrial
Security Review Committee believed that the granting of
interim clearances to nominees whose personnel security
questionnaire did not contain significant derogatory
information and who had passed a National Agency Check could
be used system-wide. Nationwide, clearance denials were
18
much less than 1 percent annually (.04 percent in FY 1982
and .06 percent in FY 1983); and the DoD Industrial Security
Review Committee felt that any additional perceived risk,
which was considered negligible, was more than offset by the
strengthened scoping and five year reinvestigation. [Ref.
13:p. 85] In addition to the timeliness factor, the DoD
Industrial Security Review Committee felt that adoption of
such a system would substantially reduce unnecessary
clearance requests by reducing the tendency of contractors
to submit clearance applications as a contingency measure
[Ref. 13:p. 85]
.
The GAO Report disagreed with the Stilwell
Commission and the DoD Industrial Security Review Committee
recommendation on how to reduce clearance processing time.
GAO recommended a reprogramming of the budget to provide the
DIS authority to hire the additional personnel needed to
expedite the investigation and processing of personnel
security clearances [Ref. 15: p. iv] . Also, GAO did not
recommend increasing the number of interim clearances. GAO
felt that a substantial increase in the number interim
clearances increased the potential for compromise of
national security information, because investigative work
done after the interim clearance is issued could provide
information that requires revocation of the clearance after
an individual has already had access to classified
information [Ref. 15:p. 10].
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As recommended by the Stilwell Commission and the
DoD Industrial Security Review Committee, an interim
clearance program was implemented by the Defense Industrial
Security Clearance Office (DISCO) in January 1989. During
fiscal year 1989, DISCO reviewed 82,445 clearance requests
to make an interim clearance determination. Of those,
69,331 were issued and 13,114 were denied [Ref. 3:p. 15].
On the average, interim clearance was issued within 5 days
and only .06 percent of the interim clearances granted were
subsequently withdrawn [Ref. 3:p. 15]. In its annual
report, DIS wrote that the impact of the interim clearance
was significant; approximately 45 days of clearance
processing time was eliminated, thereby allowing contractors
to utilize their employees immediately on classified
contracts. DIS estimated that this reduction in processing
time resulted in a savings to industry and ultimately to the
government of over $182 million in fiscal year 1989 [Ref.
3:p. 15].
Other innovations that DIS has implemented to speed
clearance processing time include a program that allows
electronic transfer of personnel security questionnaires and
letters of consent between each contractor and the DISCO.
During the pilot program, approximately seven days were cut
off the processing time for personnel clearances, with an
anticipated savings of more than $500,000 over the seven
month pilot program [Ref. 14:p. 63], An agency-wide
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communications system was implemented to allow DIS to
transmit investigative leads from its field elements to the
Personnel Investigations Center (PIC) and electronically
transfer security clearances applications and letters
authorizing clearances in order to offset costly mail delays
in security clearance processing [Ref. 3:pp. 1-2].
3 . Periodic Reinvestigations
Until the Stilwell Commission published its
recommendations in 198 6, the Department of Defense had
devoted a relatively small percentage of its investigative
resources to conducting periodic reinvestigations of cleared
employees
.
In 1985, the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations found that the DoD was conducting
reinvestigations only on a limited quota basis due to
investigative manpower restrictions and that it was unlikely
that the five-year requirement for reinvestigations would be
met in the foreseeable future [Ref. 12: p. 7].
By 1985, many individuals who had been cleared to
the Top Secret level for 20 years or longer had never been
reinvestigated [Ref. 14:p. 62]. Thomas J. O'Brien, then
Director of the Defense Investigative Service, in testimony
before the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
noted that
the reinvestigation is an essential part of personnel
security and that in almost all instances in which
21
cleared personnel have been found guilty of espionage,
it was subsequently determined that they were not
involved with foreign intelligence at the time they were
investigated and cleared. [Ref. 12 :p. 6]
Also, the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
noted that the reinvestigation backlog problem was
compounded by the fact that the largest population of
cleared personnel -- those working with Secret clearances -
were not included in the periodic reinvestigation process.
Secret, the most common of all clearance, was significant in
that there was considerable sensitive information that could
be accessed by personnel with Secret clearances; but the
investigative process for Secret clearances entailed nothing
more than a National Agency Check (NAC) [Ref. 12:p. 7].
Testifying before the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, the Director, Defense Investigative Service
stated:
While a NAC costs about $10, we [U.S.] spent thousands
for physical security measures in some programs [to
protect] secret materials, but for the people part of
it, we [U.S.] are only willing to spend $10. All our
losses have come from people. [Ref. 10 :p. 5]
The Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
[Ref. 12 :p 19] and the Stilwell Commission [Ref. 6:p. 22]
recommended regular periodic reinvestigation of personnel
with Secret and Top Secret clearances and that timely
reinvestigations should be considered as important and be




A report from the House Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence agreed with the Senate Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations and the Stilwell Commission
recommendation for reinvestigations. Additionally, the
Committee believed that the nation's long term goal should
be the regular reinvestigation of all cleared employees (Top
Secret, Secret, and Confidential). [Ref. 7:p. 16] The
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, the
Stilwell Commission, and the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence recommended that the necessary
resources to achieve a reduction in the backlog of periodic
reinvestigation must be supported by the President and
provided by the Congress [Ref. 7:p. 15]. Contrary to this
view of resolving the periodic reinvestigation problem by a
massive infusion of additional manpower, the DoD Industrial
Security Review Committee favored focusing the priority for
the selection and conduct of periodic reinvestigations on
personnel who had continuous or recurring access to Top
Secret information as opposed to the current system of
focusing on the oldest cases for such investigative coverage
[Ref. 13:p. 93]
.
Congress set a goal of 25 percent reduction in the
backlog of periodic reinvestigations for fiscal year 1986
and authorized $25 million of appropriations for the sole
purpose of carrying out "such actions as necessary to




The DIS spent $14.1 million of the $25 million
appropriated by Congress to reduce the backlog of periodic
reinvestigations, withheld $5.4 million to meet funding
reductions mandated by the Balanced Budget Act, and returned
$0.5 million to the DoD . The remaining $5 million was
allocated and spent to purchase vehicles [Ref. 16:p. 3].
Although DIS spent less than the authorized $25
million for reducing the backlog, it achieved a 22 percent
reduction in the periodic reinvestigations backlog for
fiscal year 1986, thereby almost meeting the Congressional
goal of a 25 percent reduction [Ref. 16:p. 4]
.
At the end of fiscal year 1986, reviews by the GAO
and the DoD found that the estimated backlog may have been
inaccurate because the expected results from the clearance
reduction program, implemented in 1985, were not considered
in the initial estimate of the backlog. The number of DoD
and contractor personnel requiring periodic reinvestigations
declined from about 579,000 in 1984 to 356,000 in 1986 [Ref.
16 :p. 4]. Because the clearance reduction program had
significantly reduced the population requiring periodic
reinvestigations, GAO estimated that DoD could probably
reduce the backlog more quickly than initially estimated
and, therefore, would require less funding in the coming
fiscal years to eliminate the backlog [Ref. 16:p. 4]
.
By the end of fiscal year 1989, DIS had completely
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eliminated the backlog of Top Secret periodic
reinvestigations. Also, during fiscal year 1989, DIS
initiated a program to conduct for the first time periodic
reinvestigations on all personnel holding a Secret clearance
who had not been the subject of an investigation for six
years [Ref. 3:p. 17].
4 . Adjudication of Security Clearances
The report by the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations found that one of the problems with the
investigative process was a lack of a formal training
program for personnel security adjudicators, the personnel
who, after reviewing background investigations, decide
whether or not to grant a candidate's clearance request or
revoke or maintain a current employee's clearance [Ref.
12:p. 10]. The 1985 Stilwell Commission report agreed with
the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations and
commented that DoD requires no formal training for persons
performing adjudicative functions and that the grade levels
of adjudicators appear uniformly low, considering the degree
of judgment and skill required [Ref. 6:p. 35].
The DoD Industrial Security Review Committee found
that the guidelines as set forth in DoD Directive 5200. 2R
gave very broad latitude to adjudicators on case-by-case
decisions and that, in fact, the guidelines could be ignored
if an adjudicator decided to do so. To ensure uniformity in
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the application of the criteria and to eliminate confusion
for both applicants and adjudicators, the Committee
recommended that the guidelines be amended and become
requirements to be followed. [Ref. 13 :p. 19]
GAO had advocated more consistent standards for
adjudicators for several years prior to the DoD Industrial
Security Review Committee recommendation. In testimony
before the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations,
Mr. Thurman, representing GAO, stated
the establishment of consistent standards for
investigations and adjudications cannot be fully
effective unless the investigators and adjudicators are
properly trained. Although useful guidance on personnel
investigations and adjudications is available, we {GAO]
believe that personnel involved in these activities
still need formal training government -wide. Such
training would provide greater assurance that the
investigative and adjudicative processes are performed
in a professional and consistent manner that protects
the interests of the government and the interests of the
subjects of the investigation in a fair and equitable
manner. [Ref. 12 :p. 10]
In 1988, a status report on personnel and
information by the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence found that the adjudication process was still a
bottleneck in the clearance process and that the current
methods used to accomplish the task were antiquated and in
need of revision [Ref. 10:p. 8].
The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
noted that most of the personnel security investigation
files were still maintained as paper dossiers and were
processed through the mail or by courier systems which took
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considerable time and administrative effort [Ref. 10:p. 8].
The Committee believed that automated data processing
technology and centralized clearance data bases were
desperately needed to provide early identification of cases
which did not require prolonged adjudication review so that
they could pass rapidly through the system. The Committee
felt that this could streamline the processing of "clean"
cases while providing more time for analysis of problem
cases and more effective use of limited resources. [Ref.
10:p. 9]
The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
did note that DoD had implemented a program of formal
training for its adjudicators and that consolidation of
adjudication facilities among the military services had
proceeded with limited success, with the Navy still not
fully in line in consolidating its adjudication process
[Ref. 10:p. 9]
.
5 . Financial Motives for Espionage
In 1987, a report by the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence found that most of the Americans
who were caught spying between 1984 and 198 6 had no
ideological commitment to another foreign country. They
sold U.S. secrets for financial reasons. [Ref. 9:p. 6] The
Committee stated:
it is sad fact that the preponderance of recent
espionage cases have hinged on the greed of
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Americans willing to betray their country's secrets
[Ref . 9:p. 6]
.
Of the 59 cases of espionage compiled by the
Department of Defense Security Institute for the last 15
years, 41 involved the successful or attempted exchange of
money. Thirty-one of the 41 cases involved cleared U.S.
citizens selling documents for money, and the other ten
cases involved foreign agents paying U.S. undercover agents
for documents. [Ref. 18]
The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
noted that, in the espionage cases of Pelton and John
Walker, information was available while these individuals
were still employed by the U.S. Government that could have
exposed serious personal financial difficulties and that, in
the future, financial information deserves a more important
focus in background investigations and reinvestigations
[Ref. 9:p. 16]
.
The Oversight and Evaluation Subcommittee of the
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence wrote that
increased efforts were required especially in the area of
assessing financial vulnerability among personnel holding
security clearances and that the executive branch needs to
be more skillful in utilizing the automated data bases at
its disposal that go beyond mere credit reports, such as
casino transactions, currency transactions, and foreign bank
and financial accounts [Ref. 10:p. 4].
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A 1988 study by K. J. Euske and D. P. Ward, designed
to determine if existing financial reporting sources could
be used to evaluate the financial health and behavior of
individuals in critical management positions, concluded that
the traditional sources of financial reporting (e.g. credit
reports) do not necessarily identify legitimate or
illegitimate sources of income [Ref. 17].
In assessing the value of credit reports to the
investigative process, Euske and Ward found that credit
reports would be complete only if the subject of the
investigation had provided all former addresses and aliases
or the credit history identified the addresses and aliases.
Also, Euske and Ward found that major drawbacks in using
credit reports to screen candidates and current employees
financially for positions of trust include the facts that
(1) credit reports are complex and time-consuming to
analyze, (2) there is no standardized reporting format for
the various credit services, and (3) relevant data may be
missing. [Ref. 17:P. 4-5]
In Euske and Ward's assessment of banks and other
financial institutions, they found that existing laws such
as the Right to Privacy Act restricted access to the records
of banks and other financial institutions and limit their
usefulness in financial screening for background
investigations [Ref. 17:p. 17]. The report concluded that,
at the present time, credit analysis aided by computer
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technology shows the most promise for improving background
screening through the use of publicly available financial
data and that the use of automated systems to analyze
financial health could help officials screen applicants for
positions of trust [Ref. 17:p. 17-18].
To improve the usefulness of financial information
in the investigative process, the Proposed
Counterintelligence Act of 1990 would have required all
personnel who receive Top Secret clearances to permit the
government access to their financial records anytime during
the period the clearance is held and for five years
thereafter [Ref. 19:pp. 2,10].
6 . Managerial Involvement
The Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
noted that in many cases employers were not held accountable
for security breaches. In a review of several espionage
cases, the Subcommittee found that information was developed
indicating that the compromises occurred at times when the
firms that employed the violators could have enforced
stricter adherence to security procedures [Ref. 12:p.l2]
The Stilwell Commission noted that, in every case of
recent espionage, that there had been evidence of conduct
known to the commander or supervisor which, if recognized
and reported, may have had a bearing on the continued access
of the individual [Ref. 6:p. 44].
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The Senate Permanent Subcommittee found that in the
Harper-Schuler espionage case, Schuler maintained a Secret
clearance despite the fact that she was known to be drinking
heavily and spending money beyond her means. Similarly,
Christopher Boyce, a highly cleared communications clerk in
a CIA-sponsored secret project at TRW was able to smuggle
sensitive documents out of the facility in part because of
inadequate or unenforced security procedures . Boyce
reported that drinking and other irresponsible behavior were
commonplace in sections of the plant which had been cordoned
off because of the sensitivity of the data being processed
there. William Bell, a radar specialist at Hughes Aircraft,
sold sensitive information about classified weapon systems,
including the radar system utilized on the B-l and Stealth
bombers, to Polish spies. Bell testified that, while
employed at Hughes, he had "all the signals, all the
classical reasons" for being a spy, including financial
difficulties followed by sudden affluence, job
dissatisfaction, and close friendship with a Polish
national. None of these potential indicators were reported
by Bell's employer to the Defense Investigative Service.
[Ref. 12:p. 12]
The Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
noted that in each of the above espionage cases, the
employing firms were not held accountable for the conduct of
their employees, no fines were levied and business with the
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federal government went on as before, as if the contractors
were not responsible in any way for the conduct of their
employees [Ref. 12:p. 13].
The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
found that, in many agencies, security personnel were viewed
as "cops" who carry out a sanctions-oriented process. The
investigation of a security related incident was viewed by
employees as a career damaging event that would follow one
throughout his or her career [Ref. 10:p. 11]. The Committee
said that
among the cleared population, especially among that
group cleared for the most sensitive information, we
should encourage management and command sensitivity to
their people, both on and off the job. There should be
an opportunity to share problems at early stages with a
supervisor or counselor who might be able to help,
before the problem become desperate, unsharable, and a
motive for illegal behavior like espionage develops
[Ref. 10. :p. 11]
.
The Stilwell Commission recommended the
implementation of reliability programs requiring supervisors
to perform initial and recurring evaluations to certify that
subordinates are qualified for anticipated duties [Ref. 6:p.
44] . The DoD Industrial Security Review Committee agreed
with the Stilwell Commission recommendation and commented
that alertness to espionage indicators is crucial to a sound
security program and that first line supervisors, with
proper security indoctrination working closely with
corporate security personnel in partnership with the Defense
Investigative Service, are considered the most effective
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means of ensuring the strength and integrity of the security
program on a day-to-day basis. The DoD Industrial Security
Review committee felt that neither periodic security
inspections nor the personnel security investigation program
can adequately fill this role. [Ref. 13 :p. 4]
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III. METHODOLOGY
A. DETERMINATION OF SAMPLE SIZE
The purpose of the analysis was to determine the effects
that thresholds of delinquent debt have on final clearance
decisions. The analysis required a population of completed
cases containing adverse financial information. The adverse
financial background information had to meet the Defense
Investigative Service's (DIS) delinquent debt criteria ($500
or more of debt outstanding for at least 120 days) . In
addition, the clearances for these cases had to be either
approved or denied as opposed to pending.
Fortunately, the Defense Personnel Security Education
and Research Center (PERSEREC) established a data base of
unsuitability cases with the cooperation of the Personnel
Investigations Center (PIC) . This data base contains cases
from 1987 through 198 9 and permitted cases to be analyzed by
unsuitability categories. 3 Because this analysis' focus is
on cases meeting DIS's delinquent debt criteria for
investigation expansion, only financial issue cases were
examined in this study. Cases with more than one issue were
excluded to avoid confusion regarding which issue (s) played
3For a more complete description of PERSEREC s issue
case data base see Ref. ll:p. 5.
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the greatest role in clearance decisions. Lists of
potential cases that fell into the following nine categories
were retrieved from the data base:
1. Military-Background Investigations (BI)
2. Military-Special Background Investigations (SBI)
3. Military-Periodic Reinvestigations (PR)
4. Industrial-Background Investigations (BI)
5. Industrial-Special Background Investigations
6. Industrial-Periodic Reinvestigations (PR)
7. Civilian-Background Investigations (BI)
8. Civilian-Special Background Investigations (SBI)
9. Civilian-Periodic Reinvestigations (PR)
These cases were consecutively numbered within each group.
45 cases were randomly selected from each list, yielding a
combined sample size of 405 from a population of 1110, or 36
percent of the population. The sample cases were selected
by using a computerized random number generator. After the
numbers were drawn, a list of the cases selected for the
sample was then typed and sorted by case control number.
B. COLLECTION OF DATA
Hard copies of investigation files were needed to
compute the total amount of delinquent debt outstanding in
each case and to provide the other data needed for the
analysis. Other data collected for the analysis on each
applicant included (1) reason for the investigation, (2) sex
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and race, (3) bankruptcies, garnishments, liens, judgments,
and (4) delinquent debt history. The data collection form
used to record the financial information was developed. A
copy of that form is presented in Appendix A. The required
personnel security investigation documents and credit
reports are maintained on microfiche at the Personnel
Investigations Center (PIC) . After discussing the matter
with personnel at PIC, it was determined that the most
efficient way to obtain the data would be for the author to
travel to PIC and collect the data while at that location.
The list of the investigative cases selected for the sample
was forwarded to PIC. Prior to the author's arrival, PIC
had set up a work station with a microfiche reader and had
retrieved the required cases. Five days were spent at PIC
reviewing the cases and collecting the required data.
Because there was no way to determine in advance how many
cases could be reviewed and the required data recorded in
five days and, in order to ensure that sample sizes across
groups would be equal, data were collected for the first
case randomly selected in each group, then the second case
and so on. At the end of the five days, 261 cases had been
reviewed, with 219 meeting the delinquent debt threshold
criteria of $500 or more outstanding for 120 days. This
sample was approximately 20 percent of the financial cases
population of 1110.
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C. CODING DATA FOR COMPUTER INPUT
A code book was developed to format the collected data
for computer input. A copy of the code book is presented in
Appendix B. Using that format, the data from each data
collection form were entered onto a computer input sheet.
After coding the data, the information on the input sheet
was then entered into the computer. The form used to
collect the data at PIC contained all of the necessary
information, with the exception of final clearance
determinations. In order to determine if delinquent debt
had an impact on the subjects' final clearance decisions,
the status of each applicant's security clearance was
needed. The Defense Central Index of Investigations (DCII)
is a data base that contains final clearance determinations.
This file was available at the Defense Manpower Data Center
(DMDC) and was used to determined which clearances in the
sample had been denied, were pending or had been granted.
Clearance determination codes contained in the DCII were
recoded into three categories: (1) denials, coded in the
DCII with "B", "D", "F", "R", "Y", "Z", "3" or "4"; (2)
pending, coded with "X"; and (3) granted, coded with "Q",
"S", "T", or "V". A list of the clearance access codes and
their meaning is presented in Appendix C. For some of the
analyses, delinquent debt was recoded into three categories:
(1) debt under $1000, (2) debt between $1000-$2000, and (3)
debt over $2000.
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It should be noted that at the start of the analysis the
latest update to the Defense Manpower Data Center's DCII
file was as of the end of 1990. The initial clearance
determination data were collected in February 1991. To
determine if any of the pending cases had been adjudicated
from January to May 1991, the DCII file was reviewed once
more in May 1991. In addition, the Navy's Central
Adjudication Facility (DON CAF) data base was also checked
for Naval personnel in the pending category. Further review
of the pending cases seems to suggest that some of the
pending cases are no longer in the system because of
employment terminations or retirements. Another possibility
for lack of security data may be that in some cases the




A. FREQUENCY INFORMATION FOR THE SAMPLE
The sample contained 74 background investigations (BI)
,
75 special background investigations (SBI) , and 70 periodic
reinvestigations (PR) . All 219 requests were for Top Secret
or higher level access. In addition to Top Secret access,
the 219 requests included five for assignment to Critical
Nuclear Weapon Positions, 66 for access to Sensitive
Compartmented Information (SCI) , two for assignment to
Critical Sensitive Positions, and two for access to Single
Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) . There were 31 requests
from the Navy, 20 from the Army, 25 from the Air Force, 72
from civil service, and 71 from industry. The sample
contained 154 males and 65 females. There were 156 whites,
54 blacks, two Asians, and seven Hispanics.
B. DELINQUENT DEBT THRESHOLD ANALYSIS
As previously noted, all personnel security requests
required personnel background investigations for Top Secret
access or higher. Personnel granted only Secret clearances
(as opposed to the requested Top Secret or SCI access)
presented a dilemma. Should they be classified as though
their clearances were granted or as if their clearances had
been denied? In reality, there are many reasons why
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individuals may be authorized clearances at lower levels
than originally requested. For example, personnel may have
been reassigned to positions not requiring Top Secret
access. Another reason is that some personnel are assigned
to special programs that require more intensive
investigations (BI/SBI) regardless of the assigned clearance
levels. Therefore, the analysis treated those personnel who
were granted Secret clearances as approvals. The sample had
32 pending cases which accounted for 14.6 percent of the
sample. Because the focus of the analysis was on the impact
of the delinquent debt threshold used for expanding
investigations on final clearance decisions (denials and
approvals), the pending cases were not used in the analysis.
Only the 187 investigative cases in which clearances had
actually been denied or approved were used in computing the
denial and approval percentages.
In addition to analyzing the data for the entire sample,
separate analyses were performed for each category of
requesting agency (e.g. military, industrial, and civilian)
.
By separating the cases by type of agency, it could be
determined whether the findings were consistent across the
different types of adjudication facilities.
1 . Sample Analysis
Figure 2 depicts a breakdown of clearance denials
and approvals for the entire sample. Cases in the sample
40
with delinquent debt under $1000 had a denial rate of 2
percent (1 of 50) . Cases with delinquent debt from $1000 to
$2000 had a denial rate of 5 . 5 percent (3 of 54) . When
delinquent debt was over $2000, the denial rate was 8.4
percent (7 of 83) . The overall clearance denial rate in the
sample was 6 percent (11 of 187) . The 6 percent denial rate
for the sample is considerably higher than the 1 percent
denial rate published in past studies conducted on the
personnel security program [Ref





Under $1000 $1000 to $2000 Over $2000
Current Debt Past Due
Denials Approvals
Figure 2. Sample SBI/BI Based DoD Clearances
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can be attributed to the fact that all of the sample cases
selected for this analysis were known to have derogatory
financial information exceeding the Defense Investigative
Service's delinquent debt threshold ($500 or more
outstanding for 120 days) and are not representative of a
normal population of clearance requests . The sample
clearance approval rate was 94 percent (176 of 187) . The
approval category had delinquent debt ranges from $560 to
over $23,000.
The sample shows that, as the amount of delinquent
debt increases, the denial rate also increases. This may
indicate that the higher the delinquent debt, the higher the
probability of clearance denial.
2 . Military Investigative Cases
Figure 3 depicts the clearance approvals and denials
for the military cases in the sample. Military cases with
delinquent debt under $1000 had a denial rate of 4.5 percent
(1 of 22) ; cases with delinquent debt from $1000 to $2000
had a denial rate of 6 percent (1 of 16) and for cases with
delinquent debt over $2000, the denial rate was 20.8 percent
(5 of 24) . The overall military clearance denial rate was
11 percent (7 of 62) . The military clearance approval rate
was 89 percent Military cases account for 64 percent (7 of
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Under $1000 $1000 to $2000
Current Debt Past Due
Over $2000
Denials Approvals
Figure 3. SBI/BI Based Military Clearances
As in the analysis for the entire sample, the
military denial rate increases as the amount of delinquent
debt increases . For military cases with delinquent debt
over $2000, there was a significant increase (from 1 to 5)
in the number of denials when compared to denials at the
lower delinquent debt levels.
The military component had the only denial in the
sample with delinquent debt under $1000. The data collection
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form for this denial was reviewed to determine if there was
any special reason other than delinquent debt for the
denial. The review found that the request was for access to
Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) with an delinquent
debt amount of $782. In addition to current delinquent
debt, the applicant had a past history of delinquent debt.
It is important to note that the applicant's complete
investigative file was not available for review. Factors in
the investigative file other than current delinquent debt
and a past history of delinquent debt may have had an impact
on the applicant's final clearance outcome. A further
review of military SCI requests revealed that all military
denials in the sample with delinquent debt under $5200 were
requests for SCI access . This accounted for 67 percent of
total military denials . To determine if there was any basis
to support a premise that the military services deny SCI
requests at lower delinquent debt levels than other
requests, the remaining 25 approved SCI clearances were
compared to the six denied SCI clearances . Figure 4 is a
graphical presentation of military SCI approvals and
denials. It shows that the majority of the military SCI
requests had delinquent debt under $2000. However, just as
there were clearance denials for delinquent debt levels
under $1000 to over $5000, there were also approvals at
these same delinquent debt levels. The approved clearances
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Under $1000 $1000 to $2000 Over $2000
Current Debt Past Due
Denials Approvals
Figure 4 . Military SBI Requests for SCI Access
had delinquent debts ranging from $685 to $7423. These data
do not appear to support a premise that military personnel




Figure 5 shows the denials and approvals for the
industrial cases in the sample. Note that there were no
denials for delinquent debt under $1000. Industrial cases
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with delinquent debt between $1000 to $2000 had a denial
rate of 4.5 percent and for cases with delinquent debt over
$2000, the denial rate was 6 percent. The overall
industrial clearance denial rate was 4 percent (3 of 70)
.
The clearance approval rate for industrial cases was 96
percent. As in the military cases, industrial cases show an






Under $1000 $1000 to $2000
Current Debt Past Due
Over $2000
Denials Approvals
Figure 5. SBI/BI Based Industrial Clearances
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4. Civilian Investigative Cases
Figure 6 displays the breakdown for civilian cases
.
As in the industrial cases, there were no denials for
delinquent debt under $1000. The only denial for the
civilian component was at the $1000 to $2000 delinquent debt
level. The denial rate at this delinquent debt level was 6
percent. The overall civilian denial rate was 1.8 percent
(1 of 55) . The civilian clearance approval rate was 98.2
percent. Civilian cases accounted for less than .5 percent




Under $1000 $1000 to $2000
Current Debt Past Due
Over $2000
Denials Approvals
Figure 6. SBI/BI Based Civilian Clearances
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civilian component differs from the military and industrial
components in that it does not have an increasing trend in
the denial rate as the amount of delinquent debt increases.
There is an increase in the denial rate from the under $1000
delinquent debt level to the $1000 to $2000 delinquent debt
level but a decrease from the $1000 to $2000 delinquent debt
level to the over $2000 delinquent debt level.
5 . Detailed Breakdown of Approvals and Denials
Tables 1 through 4 below provide a more detailed
breakdown of the clearance approvals and denials using
delinquent debt in $500 increments instead of the three
categories of delinquent debt used in figures 2 through 6
.
As in figures 2 through 6, the information is presented
first for the entire sample and then separately for each
category of requesting agency (e.g. military, industrial,
and civilian) . In none of these tables is there any pattern
suggesting that higher levels of delinquent debt lead to a
greater incidence of denial of clearance. Moreover, the
very small numbers of cases in the higher-debt categories

























































TOTALS 176 11 94
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TABLE 2
SBI/BI BASED MILITARY CLEARANCES
APPROVALS AND DENIALS







































TOTALS 55 89 11
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TABLE 3
SBI/BI BASED INDUSTRIAL CLEARANCES
APPROVALS AND DENIALS
#APPROVALS #DENIALS %APPROVED %DENIED
$.5-lK 15 100
$1-1. 5K 14 1 93 7
$1.5-2K 7 100
$2-2. 5K 5 100
$2.5-3K 4 100
$3-3. 5K 1 100
$3.5-4K 2 100
$4-4. 5K 1 100
$4.5-5K 1 100
$5-5. 5K 3 100
$5.5-6K 2 100
$6-6. 5K 2 100
$6.5-7K 3 100








$11-11. 5K+ 3 1 75 25
TOTALS 67 3 96
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TABLE 4
SBI/BI BASED CIVILIAN CLEARANCES
APPROVALS AND DENIALS






































TOTALS 54 1 98
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
1 . Overview
The purpose of this analysis was to determine the
impact of the delinquent debt threshold currently used by
the Defense Investigative Service (DIS) to expand
investigations on final clearance decisions. If the
analysis determined that the delinquent debt threshold
currently used was too low and had no impact on final
clearance determinations, DIS could reduce the number of
expanded investigations and thus save resources that could
be used for other programs.
To conduct the analysis, a sample of derogatory
financial cases meeting the DIS's delinquent debt threshold
criteria was selected. The total amount of delinquent debt
for each case was recorded and coded for computer input
.
The sample data file was then merged with Defense Central
Investigations Index (DCII) file to determine the final
clearance decision for each case. This provided a breakdown
by clearances approved, denied and pending at the various
delinquent debt levels. Because the focus of the analysis
was on final clearance outcomes, pending investigative cases
were excluded from the analysis.
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2 . Delinquent Debt Threshold
The analysis shows that the clearance denial rate
for investigative cases with delinquent debt under $1000 is
low (2 percent) . There was only one denial (military) in 50
cases at this delinquent debt level. This delinquent debt
category accounted for less than .5 percent of the total 6
percent clearance denial rate for the sample. If both the
increase in consumer prices from 1983 until now and the fact
that there were no denials in the industrial or civilian
components are considered, a strong argument could be made
for raising the delinquent debt threshold for investigation
expansion from $500 to $1000 for the industrial and civilian
components. The next question is what to do with the
military component. Should the $500 delinquent criteria for
investigation expansion be retained for the military? Is
one denial out of 22 cases with delinquent debt under $1000
sufficient to keep the $500 delinquent debt level for the
military? Or, if evaluated from the point of view of the
entire sample, is 1 denial out of 50 cases sufficient to
keep the delinquent debt threshold at $500? If DoD wants to
maintain uniformity in its investigative standards, can the
threshold be raised to $1000 for all components with no
significant impact on final clearance determinations?
These are difficult questions with no clear cut
answers. If the delinquent debt threshold is raised to
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$1000, over 26 percent of the cases in the sample could have
been eliminated from investigation expansion. However, 2
percent out of the 26 percent were cases in which the
clearance was denied as a result of the expansion having
been performed. By way of analogy, during fiscal year 1989,
DIS issued 69,331 interim clearances, of which only .06
percent were later withdrawn [Ref . 3:p. 15] . Thus, the
policy of interim clearances does not appear to be unduly
risky. The percentage of denials in the sample with
delinquent debt under $1000 was less that .5 percent. Thus,
raising the delinquent debt threshold may also appear not to
be unduly risky and may be an acceptable trade-off to some.
To others, however, failing to expand the investigation of
one case that may eventually become a denial may be
considered a serious breakdown in the clearance process
.
There must be a cost effective trade-off between resources
required to conduct expanded investigations and the effects
of the additional information obtained through expansions on
final clearance decisions.
In the sample, as the amount of delinquent debt
increased, the number of denials also increased. A
comparison of the over $2,000 delinquent debt category with
the two lower categories reveals that the military had a
significant increase in denials/ industrial personnel, a
minimal increase; and DoD civilian employees, a decrease.
Because clearance denials and approvals occur in each of the
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three delinquent debt categories, it is difficult to
determine the optimal delinquent debt level for
investigation expansion. However, the analysis supports
raising the delinquent debt threshold used to expand
investigations from $500 to $1000.
Additionally, the low number of denials at all
delinquent debt levels see.n to suggest that delinquent debt,
regardless of the amount, has very little impact on final
clearance decisions. This is consistent with the findings
of other studies in that the denial rate for security
clearances is very low and that the majority of denials are
in cases in which applicants have serious unsuitability
problems (e.g. criminal records, recent drug abuse,
alcoholism, or psychiatric problems) [Ref. 10:p. 4].
Because of the low number of denials in each of the
delinquent debt categories, there appear to be other
variables, such as the reason for the delinquent debt (i.e.
lay-off, sickness, being fired, extravagant spending,
lawsuits, failure to pay taxes) or whether or not the
applicant is attempting to resolve his or her financial
problems that are more crucial in the final clearance
decision. For instance, if applicants live in a depressed
area, lose their jobs, are unable to make their mortgage
payments, but promise to pay and do so as soon as they are
reemployed, most likely they will be granted a security
clearance. On the other hand, people having numerous past
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due credit card charges for non-essentials and who make no
attempt to pay their bills or reform their spending habits
will probably be considered irresponsible and unreliable and
will likely be denied a clearance.
B . RECOMMENDATIONS
There are certain limitations in this analysis of which
the reader should be aware. First, the sample used in the
analysis was relatively small when compared to the total
number of investigations performed each year by the Defense
Investigative Service (over 200,000 per year for fiscal
years 1987 through 1989) . Although the sample represented
approximately 17 percent of the cases with adverse financial
background information in the Defense Personnel Security
Research and Education Center' s (PERSEREC) data base for
1987 through 1989, caution must be used when extrapolating
these findings to the larger population (especially within
sub-population categories) . Second, the analysis focuses
only on the impact of delinquent debt on final clearance
outcomes and does not address other factors such as
unsuitable personal behavior (e.g. alcoholism, criminal
activity, psychiatric problems, etc.). These factors may
interact significantly with adverse financial information
with respect to final clearance decisions. Third, the
analysis is based on adjudication decisions (clearance
approvals and denials) as opposed to the subsequent behavior
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of applicants (e.g. security infractions, involvement in
disloyal or criminal acts, etc.) . Although it is likely
that the adjudication outcome closely reflects security risk
and it makes little sense to expand cases in which
clearances will be granted anyway, this analytical approach
could be criticized as letting the "tail wag the dog"
.
The analysis supports raising the Defense Investigative
Service's delinquent debt threshold from $500 to $1000. If
the delinquent debt threshold was raised to keep pace with
consumer prices, it would now be almost double the current
threshold amount, anyway ($950 instead of $500) . But before
a final decision is made whether or not to raise the
delinquent debt threshold, the Defense Investigative Service
should first get input from the adjudicators because they
are the ones who have to consider all relevant factors
prior to making their final clearance recommendations
.
The major purpose of DIS is to identify and select the
personnel that the nation will trust with its most sensitive
information. This may be asking DIS to do too much. As
former DIS Director T. J. O'Brien stated in testimony before
the Senate Permanent Subcommittee On Investigations,
We [DIS] feel it is unfortunate that so much emphasis
has been placed on the role of investigations in the
security clearance process, when in fact it is only a
part, and probably not the most important part of the
personnel security clearance process [Ref. 20 :p. 8].
More emphasis on the judgments of those who know the
applicants best may be needed. Local managers and
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supervisors have daily contact with their employees and,
therefore, are in a better position to select the most
trustworthy employees for sensitive positions. Initial
screening at this level is believed to be a critical step in
the investigative process. The Stilwell Commission
recommended the implementation of reliability programs
requiring supervisors to perform initial and recurring
evaluations to certify that subordinates are fit for
anticipated duties [Ref. 6:p. 44].
With billions for weapon systems procurement and the
nation's technological edge at stake, defense contractors as
well as DoD components should be more inclined to place
greater emphasis on personnel security. Suggested
improvements to the security process in the agencies and
contractors employing personnel to be cleared are as
follows: (1) a more intensive program of screening
personnel being hired or considered for sensitive positions,
(2) yearly credit checks on employees assigned to sensitive
projects, (3) increased managerial training in recognizing
changes in personnel behavior that may lead to espionage,
and (4) continued evaluation of security awareness training
programs
.
The House Select Committee on Intelligence emphasized
the importance of "encouraging security awareness by fellow
employees, who can report patterns of work activity
potentially associated with espionage" [Ref. 10:p. 11].
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C. AREA FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
One area that may provide some useful information is an
in-depth study comparing the investigative case files of
personnel in the sample who were denied clearances and those
who were granted clearances at the same level of debt . This
type of analysis could determine the underlying reasons for
the denials. If the analysis concludes that there are no
significant differences between the case files for clearance
denials and approvals, it may be interesting to look at what
organizations issued the denials, what organizations issued
the approvals, and which were more in line with the
adjudication standards in their final decisions.
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B. REASON FOR THE INVESTIGATION.
1. ACCESS TO TOP SECRET INFO yes /no
2. Critical Nuclear Weapon Position yes / no
3. Limited access authorization yes / no
4. SCI yes / no
5. Critical Sensitive Position yes / no
6. ADP-1 yes / no
7. CRYPTO/COMSEC yes / no
8. SIOP/ESI yes/no























(1) PSQ yes / no
(2) DIS Interview yes / no
(3) Credit Report yes / no
2. NO
H. HISTORY OF WAGE GARNISHMENT?
3. YES
a. Sources
(1) PSQ yes / no
(2) DIS Interview yes / no
(3) Credit report yes / no
4. NO
I. HISTORY OF LIENS?
5. YES
a. Sources
(1) PSQ yes/ no
(2) DIS Interview yes / no
(3) Credit Report yes / no





(1) PSQ yes / no
(2) DIS Interview yes / no
(3) Credit Report yes / no
(4) Other yes / no List:
8. NO
HISTORY OF DELINQUENT DEBT?
9. YES
a. Sources
(1) PSQ yes / no
(2) DIS Interview yes / no
(3) Credit Report yes / no
(4) Other yes / no List:
b. Number of days past due
(1) 120 days
(a) # of accounts
(b) Total # of incidents.
(2) 90 days
(c) # of accounts
(d) Total # of incidents.
(3) 60 days
(e) # of accounts
(f) Total # od incidents
(4) 30 days
6 5
(g) # of accounts.
(h) Total # of incidents
10. NO
L. DELINQUENT DEBT AT TIME OF INVESTIGATION
1. 120 DAYS PAST DUE




2. 90 DAYS PAST DUE
a. # of accounts
b Total $ amount
3. 60 DAYS PAST DUE
a. # of accounts
b. Total $ amount,
30 DAYS PAST DUE
a. # of accounts
b. Total $ amount
N. EXPANDED INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED?
1. YES
2. NO




































9 digits, no spacing
DIS Case Control Number
dash (-) after 5th, 8th, and 12th digit
Category of the Investigation
1 - Background Investigation (BI)
2 - Special Background Investigation (SBI)
3 - Periodic Reinvestigation (PR)
Reason for Investigation
1 - Top Secret Material Access
2 - Critical Nuclear Weapon Position
3 - Limited Access Authorization
4 - SCI




1 - Military, Navy/Marine
2 - Military, Army
3 - Military, Air Force


















3 - Asian/Pacif Isl
4 - Hispanic
5 - American Ind/Alaskan
Age of Applicant at time request was submitted
Two digit number









Applicant reported Bankruptcy of PSQ
1 - yes
2 - no









Applicant's Bankruptcy was on the credit report
1 - yes
2 - no
















Wage garnishment reflected on credit report
1 - Yes
2 - No





































Applicant discussed liens during DIS interview
1 - Yes
2 - No
Liens reflected on credit report
1 - Yes
2 - No
Applicant has a history of Judgments
1 - Yes
2 - No




Judgments reflected on credit report
1 - Yes
2 - No
History of Delinquent Debt
1 - Yes
2 - No
Historical # of accounts 120 days or more past
due
Code numerical through 9
Total # of incidents historically of accounts 120
days or more past due
Code 2 digits numerical through 30
Historical # of accounts 90 days past due
Code numerical through 9
Total # of incidents historically of accounts 90
days past due
Code 2 digits numerical through 30
Historical # of accounts 60 days past due






































Total # of incidents historically of accounts 60
days past due
Code 2 digits numerical through 30
Historical # of incidents 30 days past due
code numerical through 9
Total # of incidents historically of accounts 30
days past due
Code 2 digits numerical through 30
# of accounts delinquent 120 days or more at time
of investigation
Code numerical from through 10
Total dollar amount of accounts delinquent 120
days of more
Code numerical 5 digit dollar amount
# of accounts delinquent 90 days at time of
investigation
Code numerical through 10
Total dollar amount of accounts delinquent 90
days
Code numerical 4 digit dollar amount
# of accounts delinquent 60 days at time of
investigation
code numerical from through 10
Total dollar amount of accounts delinquent 60
days
Code numerical 4 digit dollar amount
# of accounts delinquent 30 days at time of
investigation
code numerical from through 10
Total dollar amount of accounts delinquent 30
days





CLGR Applicant was granted a security clearance
line 2
71 1 - Clearance denied
2 - Clearance pending
3 - Clearance granted
71
APPENDIX C




F SCI REVOKED - INELIGIBLE FOR CLEARANCE
Q NO CLEARANCE/ACCESS REQUIRED - FAVORABLE
INVESTIGATION
R CLEARANCE REVOKED
S SECRET CLEARANCE GRANTED
T TOP SECRET CLEARANCE GRANTED
V TOP SECRET - SCI ELIGIBLE
X FINAL CLEARANCE DETERMINATION PENDING
Y PENDING FINAL ADJUDICATION/ACCESS SUSPENDED
Z ADJUDICATION ACTION INCOMPLETE DUE TO LOSS OF
JURISDICTION
3 PENDING REPLY TO LETTER OF INTENT/ STATEMENTS OF
REASONS









2. Library, Code 0142
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3. Defense Personnel Security Research 1
and Education Center
99 Pacific Street, Bldg. 455, Suite E
Monterey, CA 93940-2481
4. Mr. William Hughes 1
Director
Personnel Investigations Center
DO601, P.O. Box 1211
Baltimore, MD 21203-1211
5. Mr. Peter Nelson 1
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CI & IP Directorate
The Pentagon, Room 3C267
Washington, DC 20301-2000
6. Mr. Ray W. Pollari, Director 1
Counterintelligence & Investigative Programs, ODUSD(P)
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Washington, DC 20301-2000
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Asst. Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (CI&S)
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8 Mr . Dan Jacobsen 1
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Department of the Navy
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10. Mr. Thomas F. Eward
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Defense Investigative Service
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Washington, DC 20301-2000
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12. Mr. Avon Yarborough
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cl Impact of altering the
delinquent debt threshold
used for background in-
vestigation expansion on




cl Impact of altering the
delinquent debt threshold
used for background in-
vestigation expansion on
the denial rate of
security clearances.

